ISLAMABAD, Pakistan — So, what is happening with the Pakistan Taliban?

From where I stand, there is a curious pattern to recent events.

Let's connect the dots: a few weeks ago, a new Taliban code of conduct emerged ordering more discipline and less brutality, especially against local civilians.

Reports immediately surfaced within Pakistan that some hard-line militants were rejecting the new code, preferring to continue a campaign of terror that includes beheading people and publicly displaying the bodies.

Then – late last month – I made contact with a senior Taliban leader who had fought on the frontlines in Afghanistan and helped lead a bloody uprising at Islamabad's Red Mosque in 2007.

I was expecting the usual anti-American diatribe and I got that; but I got something else - a surprising denunciation of other Pakistani Taliban.

He labeled them 'not real Taliban' and said they had no future. He said his allegiance was to the Afghan Taliban leader, Mullah Omar, and the real fight was against coalition forces in Afghanistan, not Pakistan's military.

He also surprisingly mentioned the leader of the Pakistani Taliban, Baitullah Mehsud, rejecting his authority and saying he had no contact with him.

Just a few days ago, Mehsud was reported to have been killed in a U.S drone strike, though his death has not been confirmed.

Now there are reports from Pakistani officials of a shoot-out among Taliban rivals during a meeting to choose a successor to Mehsud, leaving one senior commander dead. The Taliban have denied the reports.

All of this takes place amid a Pakistan military offensive against the Taliban, a U.S. military surge in Afghanistan and an upcoming Afghan election. At the same time, the international community is talking of negotiating with so-called 'good Taliban.'

The Taliban in Pakistan and Afghanistan continue to reject the possibility of negotiations. That at least is the public face; but in Pakistan there is the new code of conduct, an increasingly effective campaign of missile attacks by the United States, Taliban turning on Taliban and –- probably - the deaths of senior militants. It may be the militants themselves are trying to define just who are the 'good Taliban.'

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan - The car in front of me is carrying a man at the heart of the Taliban uprising in Pakistan.

This has been a carefully orchestrated rendezvous: Secrecy is everything.

We arranged for our cars to pass at a designated spot at a turnoff on the outskirts of Pakistan's capital, Islamabad.

We slow down, and the other car positions in front of us.

We are led down a narrow alleyway and into a non-descript house for a face-to-face interview.

This has all been patiently organized by our intermediary, a man known to the militant and trusted by us.

But there are always nagging concerns. Some in our car are a little nervous, and that is perfectly understandable, but I am comfortable we have taken every safeguard.

The man I finally meet is tall, probably in his mid-to-late 30's with a heavy black beard. He is wearing a white shawal kameez (traditional Pakistani dress), and he ties a white turban around his head.

He is wanted by Pakistani police for terrorism.

This is a man who has fought on the front lines both in Pakistan and Afghanistan. He was a leader of the Red Mosque in Islamabad, the scene of a siege by Pakistan military in 2007 which left more than 100 people dead.

We can't film his face, and we can't identify him. He tells us we can refer to him only as “Mullah Wajid.”

As we begin the interview, at first he won't meet my eye. When we shake hands he looks slightly away.

My cameraman can only film him from behind, and he won't allow us even to film his hands.

Two men stand behind our camera watching every shot. When the interview is over they command us to stop filming immediately.

But the interview itself is a surprise. Interviews with Taliban are rare. To have the chance to put questions directly to a man so heavily involved in the insurgency shines a light into a world often closed from us.

I expect the usual anti-America diatribe, and there is. He says the U.S and coalition forces must leave Afghanistan, and he wants a return to Taliban rule there.

He also criticizes some in Pakistan for being pro-U.S and implementing U.S. foreign policy.

What I wasn't expecting was his denunciation of other Taliban.

He says some in Pakistan have gone too far and are inflicting suffering on ordinary civilians. He says the supreme Taliban leader, Mullah Omar, has rejected these militants and says they are not “real Taliban.”

This is a twist, and it comes after the release of a new Taliban code of conduct. The code says civilian suffering and casualties are to be avoided, urging Taliban to go after “high value” targets like coalition troops and government officials.

The Taliban is bogged down in heavy fighting both in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Like any insurgency, if it loses the people, it loses the war.

And now the U.S. and others are seeking out what they call “good Taliban:” moderate militants they can negotiate with.

The Taliban leadership wants to cleanse itself of the rogue elements. It wants to present a disciplined, cohesive force that can't easily be divided and conquered.

“Mullah Wajid” may be rejecting some hard-liners, but he hasn't gone soft. He wants nothing less than the U.S. out of all Muslim land.

I ask him if he is prepared to kill and die for his beliefs.

"Yes. Inshallah (God willing).”

In that he is not so different from other Taliban after all.

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan – The Taliban is on a public relations drive. The militants fighting on fronts from Afghanistan to Pakistan fear they are losing the propaganda war among their own people. So, the leadership is doing something about it, releasing a new "code of conduct" for fighters in the field.

This is a how-to guide as to what is acceptable and what is not. For instance: "A brave son of Islam should not be used for lower and useless targets." What does this mean? Crudely, kill soldiers and other "high value" targets and avoid civilian casualties.

There is to be a reduction in suicide bombings, again to avoid killing civilians; Taliban fighters are not allowed to discriminate against people based on tribal roots, language or where people are from.

This code also reinforces a strict hierarchy: only provincial commanders can agree to prisoner exchanges and prisoners must not be released or exchanged for money.

Only Taliban supreme leader Mullah Omar, or one of his deputies, can give the order to execute NATO soldiers, senior Afghan army officers or government officials.

And so it goes on. You get the meaning. This code of conduct is to show that the Taliban is a disciplined force, instead of a brutal force, one fighting for the people.

This isn't new of course: the Taliban has issued similar codes in the past. What is interesting is that this new one is being issued at this time.

Now, most of this is aimed at Afghanistan - but it applies equally to Taliban in Pakistan. Indeed the booklet was produced and released from Pakistan.

Personally, I have heard from people who have turned away from the Taliban. Locals who may have had sympathies with the militants have grown tired of the reign of terror and violence.

Look at Pakistan's Swat Valley: I have seen the images of beheaded bodies being displayed in the town square, of women publicly beaten. Hardly behavior that meets this code of conduct.

The lesson of insurgencies the world over is: "If you don't win the people you don't win the war."

But already there are reports surfacing that some "hardliners" in the Taliban want to continue doing business as usual, rejecting the code.

Now, here's another interesting point: this code comes as Afghanistan heads to a new presidential election in August and the U.S and others begin to reach out to the so-called "good Taliban" - the militants they can work with.

Undoubtedly there are more moderate elements among the insurgency, there are some who have split from the Taliban.

But this is an intricate network of tribes, kinship and shared allegiances, motivated as much by money and revenge as often as ideology. Where is the "code" for separating the "good" from the "bad" Taliban?

OUTSIDE PESHAWAR, Pakistan – General Nadeem Ahmad is about to make a stunning and frightening admission. In a crowded relief camp outside Peshawar in Pakistan’s northwest, he admits he may well be handing over money to Taliban fighters posing as refugees.

General Nadeem is coordinating relief funds, with 4 billion rupees (about $500 million) being handed out so far.

People queue for hours to have their identities checked and receive their money. It is a painstaking and cautious process - but not foolproof.

It is certain that some of those receiving the money are militants, ready to return home and wreak havoc.

This is the complex problem facing General Nadeem and others fighting an enemy they often cannot see.

He is the man in charge of resettling the almost three million Pakistanis who have fled the fighting between the army and the Taliban.

It has been an extraordinary effort: tent cities appearing overnight, and providing food, water, shelter and medical treatment for the young and old, men and women.

These people are refugees in their own country, victims of a war they did not start and mostly want no part of.

But there are others lurking here. The Taliban have vanished back into the population.

They look the same, they dress the same: Men with beards in traditional Pakistani dress, the shawal kameez – making for an invisible enemy.

The people he says are now emboldened; identifying the militants in their midst and informing police.

But how many go undetected?

For the Pakistan military, fighting the Taliban is like wrestling with a column of smoke: once detected it simply changes shape and moves.

It is a matter of history now that the Taliban was spawned and promoted here in Pakistan. Back then, they were handy foot soldiers for the war with the Soviets in Afghanistan.

But Pakistan has a tiger by the tail.

The Taliban has threatened large parts of Pakistan, and actually managed to gain control of some regions close to the capital Islamabad.

This comes after years of insurgent violence. Since the 9/11 attacks in 2001 in the U.S., Pakistan has suffered around 6,000 terrorist attacks.

There have been more suicide bombings in Pakistan than either Iraq or Afghanistan. Former Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto, was assassinated in an attack.

Terrorism has drained the economy: estimates of the cost to Pakistan runs to at least $40 billion. That far outweighs the estimated $13 billion the U.S. has given Pakistan for its role in the war on terror.

Soldiers earning only $100 a month are now fighting and dying to turn back the Taliban.

In parts of the country, the army is claiming victory.

But as many Taliban are being killed, many others are simply vanishing.

General Nadeem flies me over the war-torn Swat Valley, from our helicopter he points to the mountains: “That’s where they have fled to,” he said.

Beyond that is Afghanistan, where U.S. and NATO forces are also trying to oust the militants from their strongholds.

But the Taliban can so easily cross the border into Pakistan, and there they vanish. More invisible fighters in what many Pakistanis admit is "a battle for our soul."

SHER GARGH, Pakistan – This is cruel. Women, old people and young children – many of them babies – sweltering in blistering temperatures. Their convoys have converged into a massive traffic jam: gridlock. The cars, trucks and buses stretch as far as the eye can see. They are among the millions of refugees who have fled months of fighting between the Pakistan military and the Taliban. Now their government is telling them to go home: it is safe they say. But where is the planning? How can tens of thousands of people, carrying all they own, take to the roads without chaos?

Today, it seems there is a breakdown in communication at the roadside checkpoints. The army is blaming the police for incompetence. But as in this war, it is those caught in the crossfire that are paying the price.

One man screams at our camera that he has no food, no water; his children are crying. Another man dips his screaming child into the polluted water of a nearby canal for relief. The boy already has terrible sores all over his head; this won't help. Other children lie comatose in trucks, and old women look pleadingly at me as I give them what water I have.

Remember, when they get home they return to a battleground: houses destroyed, businesses shut, army patrols, the Taliban still lurking. Their lives, like this traffic jam; trapped and no relief in sight.